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This case was a judicial review over the reallocation of unused
fishing quota from the from the larger to smaller scale
operators. The larger operators sought to quash the decision
on the grounds of legitimate expectation, interference with a
possession under human rights law and discrimination. The
claim was dismissed on all three grounds but the reasoning
for the dismissal of the human rights claim potentially
established fishing quota as a possession, before finding no
interference as unused quota had no value. Since most quota
in the UK is used this could require compensation to fishers if
there are further adjustments.
In the case of United Kingdom Association of Fish Producer
Organisations v Secretary of State for Environment, Food
and Rural Affairs [2013] EWHC (Admin) 1959, Mr Justice
Cranston handed down one of the most important
judgments regarding the creation of proprietary rights
from state licences in recent years. The case was a
judicial review against a decision by the Department for
the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra) to
redistribute unused fishing quota from the English Fish
Producer Organisations (FPOs) to the English inshore
fishing fleet. FPOs were originally free associations of
commercial fishing companies recognised by EU law with
rights and obligations relating to the market in fishery
products. In the UK FPOs also have a role in the collec-
tive control of much of the UK's fishing quota on behalf of
their members. The UK fleet of smaller inshore vessels,
although employing a large number of fishers, is largely
outside the FPO system and has historically been allo-
cated little quota. The case concerned a small amount of
unused quota (worth marginally more than »1 million)
but the points of principle related to the very nature of
the UK fishing quota itself which, together with vessel
licences, was valued in 1999 at more than »1 billion. The
effects of the decision were to be so significant that the
court permitted intervention not only by representatives
of the smaller fishermen but also by the environmental
campaign group Greenpeace.
The claimant relied on a substantive legitimate ex-
pectation and Article 1Protocol 1 (A1P1) of the European
Convention on Human Rights to substantiate its claim
that, although fishing quota was granted on a tempor-
ary basis, the practice had become so established that
quota now amounted to a possession. The claimant also
raised a further point of discrimination between English
FPOs and those based elsewhere in the UK, on the basis
that the redistribution of quotas was to affect only English
FPOs.
The legitimate expectation claimwas based on corres-
pondence between Defra and fisheries leaders that the
current practice of allocating quota would be permitted
to continue and that the policy would not be affected by
failing to capture the entire annual quota. Mr Justice
Cranston detailed a good current assessment of both the
domestic and the EUlegal basis for legitimate expectation
^ something of interest for followers of this rapidly
developing area of law (para 80) ^ and then dismissed
the claim on the basis that there had been no clear, un-
ambiguous and unqualified undertaking given by the
Defra (para 99). He also went on to determine that the
minister's actions were proportionate (para106).
With regard to the third ground, that of discrimination,
Mr Justice Cranston emphasised p`ractical policy making
in the light of devolution settlements' (para 126) and held
that there was no discrimination.However, it is question-
able whether we can infer that pragmatism and devolution
are sufficient criteria to show that no discrimination
occurred. Secondly, he considered that if discrimination
had occurred, this would have been objectively justified
because the aim was to maximise the utilisation of avail-
able quota. The principle of equal treatment and non-
discrimination requires that comparable situations must
not be treated differently and different situations must
not be treated in the same way unless such treatment is
objectively justified. That would seem to have been the
case here.
It is the human rights elementthat is problematic, mired
as it is in the complexity of fisheries regulation, property
rights and the definition of possession and justif ied
interference/deprivation under A1P1of the ECHR.
Mr Justice Cranston had s`ympathy' with the inter-
veners' contention that fish are a public resource (para
100), but this shows a real failure to understand the
fundamental principles of the case. Fish are ownerless
until captured and then they become the property of the
captor. It is the right to fish or, more explicitly, the right to
undertake fishing, which is the public right. The implica-
tions of this point, although acknowledged, were never
fully appreciated or dealt with in the judgment.
Instead, the judge looked at quota itself and tried to
decide whether it is a possession under human rights law
and whether its removal amounts to an unlawful inter-
ference/deprivation (para 109). It is at this point that the
judgment becomes contradictory, effectively requiring
two universes. In the first universe all fishery is publicly
owned; in the second only those fisheries outside the
quota system remain public as the quota regime has the
effect of excluding public ownership by turning quota
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into a possession. The judgment tacitly endorses both
contradictory universes at the same time.Without
relying on specif ic authority it states: `for better or
worse the concept of possessions have been given an
expansive interpretation' (para 112) and, because trades
in quota have been authorised, quota has been taxed
and has a value so that it has become a possession (para
113). At a stroke this finding destroyed the public's value in
the resource, and therefore this point deserved a far
fuller investigation than it received in the judgment.
The judge continued by stating that although quota is
a possession, its redistribution did not amount to an
unlawful interference with or deprivation of quota
because that particular quota had been consistently
unused and therefore had no economic value. The FPOs
would not suffer economic loss and therefore no com-
pensation would be payable.
This reasoning seems to be a rather narrow inter-
pretation of the law.Relying on R (Malik) vWaltham Forest
NHS Primary Care Trust [2007] EWCA Civ 265 and
quoting from Rix LJ, the judge stated that there would
be an interference for the purpose of Article 1 only i`f
there had been material economic consequences' (para
115). In this case, because the quota had not been used,
quota transfer to the smaller fishing fleet did not con-
stitute interference as it did not make the dispossessed
FPOs worse off.
The judge only considered possession in economic
terms. Moreover, the definition of economic loss was
narrow in itself. In fact, the judge stated that no eco-
nomic loss would occur because the quotas in question
had not been used for a definite number of years (para
119). The question that arises, therefore, concerns
assessment of any economic loss. Can it be measured, as
in this case, by reference to the economic gain (owing to
its use) in a determined period of time? And if so, what
is the appropriate length of time to decide whether
something has or does not have value? And what about
including the possibility of future use? More broadly, is
the emphasis on `use' at all justifiable? Like an unused
spare room, an unused possession still has a value. This
was not disputed by either of the main parties, who both
used valuation data in their evidence.
It is surprising that no mention of the public interest
was made to justify the argument that the deprivation
was lawful. The judge might have relied on the public
good argument, which he could have done had he estab-
lished a connection with redistribution of scarce fishing
resources as serving sustainability goals. This is a shame,
especially because the economic argument is weak.
The result of the decision is that the vast majority of
quota, if actively used, is potentially a possession and
therefore could require compensation if it is reallocated;
that is unless, of course, the opposite view from reading
the same judgment is taken, namely that the fishery
remains a public resource.
Reading this decision from the perspective of proper
resource management, it looks even more peculiar
because it may have the perverse incentive of pushing
fishers to use all their quota merely to ensure its con-
tinued allocation and to protect their possession. This
position is compounded by the reformed common fish-
eries policy (CFP), which is likely to require a reallocation
of quota in line with sustainable practice.Will that now
require compensation to those dispossessed quota
holders? If we follow the judgment it specifically incen-
tivises those engaged in unsustainable fishing to use their
quota to ensure compensation when quota is removed
under the CFP rules.
Despite the peculiar result the case has not been
appealed and the minister's decision to reallocate unused
quota stands. Perhaps the claimants did not appeal the
decision because they established the principle of quota
as a possession and they were happy to leave it there.
Since the vast majority of quota is used this could amount
to the creation of a very substantial proprietary right
indeed, at the expense of the public. For the other
parties it would be surprising to appeal a decision
ostensibly in their favour on the facts.
In short, the story is unlikely to end here and this is just
another messy chapter in the eventful tale of UKfisheries
management.
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